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INTRODUCTION
Whenever the words "China" and "intellectual property" appear in the same sentence, images of rampant piracy immediately dominate normative SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:773 As shown by an analysis of the pertinent data and the Chinese courts' written opinions, China's embrace of intellectual property rights runs counter to the normative assumption of China as the land of piracy. 16 More importantly, while China is developing a stronger intellectual property rights regime, advocates in the United States seek a weaker system. 17 Part II focuses on the current shift towards weaker intellectual property rights unfolding in the United States. The United States is often viewed by people inside and outside the United States as a litigious society; 18 perhaps soon this view will no longer hold true when compared to intellectual property enforcement in the emerging New China. Claims like "there are too many frivolous lawsuits" and "it is too costly" to do business have become familiar in shaping tort litigation reform in the United States in the last decade. 19 Successful tort law reform has drastically curbed personal injury litigation. 20 In recent years, there has been a similar effort to reform intellectual property litigation. 21 244-45 (1996) ) (analyzing a study claiming that more than eighty percent of jurors "believed that there were too many frivolous lawsuits"). See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Had is Between People's Ears": Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV Proponents for intellectual property litigation reform claim that a strong property regime has stifled competition 23 and increased litigation costs in the United States. 24 Some critics complain that intellectual property owners, particularly patent holders, abuse their rights by filing too many patent litigation suits across the United States. 25 This criticism of patent litigation is not supported by the evidence, which indicates that patent lawsuit filings have been relatively flat, averaging 2,819 patent cases filed yearly in the United States from 2002 to 2007. 26 Nonetheless, patent litigation reform has generated much attention in Congress. 27 While the number of patent litigation cases in the United States remains fairly steady, the pendulum's tempo quickens for China. In 2006, there were 3,196 patent litigation cases, 28 and in 2008, the number increased to 4,074 cases in China. 29 Nevertheless, many corporate officers, legislators, lobbyists, and commentators demand that Congress revamp the current system into a weaker, more constrained 23 . See, e.g., FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY 111-12 (1994) (explaining how American and Japanese companies have been using patent litigation to prohibit competition). See also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998) (arguing that strong patent systems slow innovation in biotech). The view that strong patents prohibit innovation receives support outside the United States, particularly in Canada and Europe. See, e.g., James Morgan, Patent System 'Stifling Science', BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2008, 8:56 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7632318.stm (reporting on a study by Canadian-based consultants Innovation Partnership calling strong intellectual property rights "ultimately counter-productive for both industry and consumers").
24. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 14-16 (2008) (suggesting litigation costs can limit profitability of patents intellectual property law regime, particularly regarding patent enforcement in the United States. 30 Part II explains the entrenched view that equates China to the piracy of intellectual property. U.S. government officials, policy makers, and industry experts all criticize China for national and global problems relating to intellectual property piracy. None have recognized the drastic transformation in China with respect to intellectual property protection and litigation.
Part III quantitatively demonstrates through case analysis that China has embraced intellectual property rights on a massive scale. This section examines the number of cases filed each year involving trademark, copyright, and patent infringements. The high volume of cases filed in both lower and appellate courts in China from 2003 through 2007 demonstrates the enforcement trend. The upward trajectory shows China has come full circle in recognizing and enforcing intellectual property rights.
Part IV affirms the quantitative study of Chinese intellectual property litigation cases by examining the translations of written decisions opined by Chinese courts. The decisions reveal that Chinese owners of intellectual property rights are relying on the judicial system to adjudicate their rights. The decisions also show that Chinese intellectual property owners are similar to their U.S. counterparts: They assert their rights in typical intellectual property infringement and breach of contract cases involving patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
Part V identifies a puzzle which emerged from the quantitative and qualitative studies on Chinese intellectual property: there is a conspicuous absence of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants. Indeed, it is puzzling to discover that there are few intellectual property lawsuits brought by foreign intellectual property owners against the Chinese, since foreign intellectual property owners have persistently criticized Chinese violations of intellectual property rights. makers and legal scholars in developing their policies and approaches to the New China.
I. UNITED STATES: REJECTING A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME

A. Mobilizing for Fewer Intellectual Property Rights
The United States has positioned itself in the last few decades as a country with strong intellectual property protections and enforcement systems. 31 Intellectual property owners enjoy a robust intellectual property rights regime recognized and supported by a transparent legal system. 32 Owners rely on the legal system to enforce their rights, enjoin infringers, and collect damages, either via pretrial settlements or jury awards. 33 regime for intellectual property rights is losing steam due to criticism that the protection has gone too far. 34 In recent years, there have been efforts to reduce protections of intellectual property rights. Opponents assert that intellectual property owners use abusive litigation tactics to enforce their rights, and consequently, intellectual property litigation, especially involving patented innovations, has gotten out of control. 35 In response, critics of intellectual property litigation demand changes that would weaken intellectual property rights. 36 For example, the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy of the National Research Council claims that the number of patent cases has been on the rise. 37 The Committee insists that the rise in litigation numbers has become a critical problem that must be addressed. 38 The Committee also advocates that established legal standards in patent law, such as "willful infringement," disclosure of "best mode" for implementing an invention, and a patent attorney's "inequitable conduct," should be either eliminated or modified to reduce patent litigation costs. Numerous commentators claim that patent litigation in the United States "stifles substantial technological innovation" and that the patent litigation system is seriously "broken." 40 At congressional hearings on patent law reform, testimony from industry experts maintained that the rise in patent cases and the breakdown of the patent litigation system lie with patent owners who aggressively litigate to uphold their patent rights. 41 The patent owners behave like "trolls" or extortionists, 42 "harming consumers and both small and large innovative companies." 43 Specifically, the cost of litigation to defend against includ[ing] whether someone 'willfully' infringed a patent, whether a patent application included the 'best mode' for implementing an invention, and whether a patent attorney engaged in 'inequitable conduct' by intentionally failing to disclose all prior art when applying for a patent. Investigating these questions requires time-consuming, expensive, and ultimately subjective pretrial discovery. The committee believes that significantly modifying or eliminating these rules would increase the predictability of patent dispute outcomes without substantially affecting the principles that these aspects of the enforcement system were meant to promote" ) ("To illustrate problems in the current remedy system, imagine a company (either a large or small company) that brings an exciting new information service to market. The company has invested tens of millions of dollars in research, equipment, marketing, etc. and may have negotiated license arrangements on a variety of patents needed for the service. Then, without warning, the company is hit with a patent infringement suit by another patent owner the company was previously unaware of who owns a patent that relates to a small part of the overall service. The patent owner demands as damages a portion of the monthly fee charged to subscribers for the overall service, including the new information service. In addition, the patent owner asks for an injunction, which would prevent the company from providing the service at all merely as a way to gain leverage and increase the likelihood of a favorable license fee. Thus, the new service can be essentially paralyzed until the patent dispute is resolved . . . . In the end, most companies settle with the patent owner rather than run the risk SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:773 these patent owners "sap[s] resources that would otherwise be available for research and innovation," causing small companies to change their research agendas and large companies to develop mechanisms to fend off patentinfringement lawsuits. 44 Overall, commentators asserted that abusive patent litigation in the United States "deters innovation and harms our entire economy." 45 They urged that Congress must immediately reform patent litigation. 46 Critics declare that the patent system must be "restored to balance" in view of extortionist behavior of patent owners. 47 Consequently, they champion for weaker patent rights. 48 Specifically, they want to limit a patent owner's right to obtain an injunctive relief against a defendant. Critics insist that an injunction should only be made available if the patent owner can demonstrate that it is "likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by the payment of money damages alone." 49 They also propose to of litigating. Consumers are the real losers, as they either pay the price of the litigation through increases in retail prices, or, in many cases, are never offered the new service.").
44. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 29 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.). See also Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra note 41, at 43 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems) ("As a result, a company creating a new product must consider whether that product will be sufficiently profitable to cover not only development and production costs, but also potential settlement payments on unjustified infringement claims. The risk of infringement lawsuits will cause some firms 'to avoid the mine field altogether, that is, refrain from introducing certain products for fear of holdup.'").
45. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 29 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.). See also Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra note 41, at 43 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (stating that patent litigation "deters innovation and thereby inflicts significant damage upon our entire economy").
46. Frank, supra note 40, at 2 ("Current debate on patent reform is largely nonpartisan, but this is in large part because the organized plaintiffs' bar does not currently have a vested interest in the status quo of patent litigation. Should they obtain such a vested interest, future legislative efforts will have a partisan tinge that will make constructive changes more difficult. The time for reform, if ever, is now.").
47. Patent Trolls Hearing, supra note 30, at 28 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel of Time Warner, Inc.) ("We urge that the [patent] system be restored to balance in view of the reality of a new breed of middlemen patent speculators.").
48. Perspectives on Patents Hearing, supra note 41, at 40 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (stating "Cisco favor[s] rule[] changes that some charge would decrease the value of patents" because the "patent litigation system is broken").
49. Patent Law Reform Hearing, supra note 43, at 68, 72 (statement of Jonathan Band) (testifying on behalf of Visa U.S.A. and The Financial Services Roundtable). Mr. Band advocated the "immediate and irreparable injury" standard in lieu of the United Kingdom's "complex compulsory license provision[s]." Id. eliminate treble damages for willful patent infringement. 50 The concerted lobbying pressure on Congress to reject long-established intellectual property rights has resulted in several pieces of proposed legislation to overhaul the patent litigation system. 51 The rejection of strong intellectual property rights is not confined to Congress; it has also spread to the Supreme Court. For example, the Court in eBay v. MercExchange eliminated the patent owner's right to automatic injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. 52 Before eBay, the patent owner, upon successfully showing that the defendant had infringed on the patent, was automatically entitled to injunction against the defendant. 53 That meant the patent owner did not have to prove whether an injunction should be granted after the infringement had been found. The patent owner was presumed irreparably harmed by the infringing conduct of the defendant. 54 The right to automatic injunctive relief was a powerful and potent weapon that the patent owner could utilize to force infringers to negotiate, because the defendants often did not want to stop selling the infringing products in the marketplace. 55 The Federal courts had long understood the importance of injunctive relief in 50. See, e.g., id. at 10; Stirland, supra note 25, at 612 (advising treble damages only after malicious patent infringement).
While the Patent Act's provisions concerning injunctions and damages would need adjustment even if the Patent Office granted only valid patents, the patent quality problem makes the need for litigation reform all the more compelling. The possibility of a broad injunction and treble damages means that a financial services institution must take even the most frivolous patent infringement claim seriously.
The current rules regarding injunctions and damages place all the leverage in the hands of the patent owner, even if the patent is extremely weak . . . . If Congress does not correct the remedies under the patent law, the surge in the number of patents relating to financial services will lead to financial services institutions paying out ever-larger license fees to holders of suspect patents, to the detriment of our customers. Patent Law Reform, supra note 43, at 9-10 (2005) (statement of Jonathan Band patent cases as "the essence of the concept of property" and, therefore, utilized the automatic rule to protect the property rights of the patent owner. 56 The Supreme Court, in eBay v. MercExchange, reversed the wellestablished rule of automatic patent injunction, holding that patent owners no longer have a categorical right to injunction after prevailing in an infringement suit. 57 Instead, the patent owners must establish that they are entitled to an injunction under a difficult four-part test proving: 1) irreparable injury; 2) lack of adequate remedies at law; 3) the public's interest lies in the injunction; and 4) by balancing the defendant's and patentee's interests. 58 The decision rejects the strong patent protections long enjoyed by patent owners in the United States, removing the threat of injunction that patent owners previously utilized to gain leverage over alleged infringers. 59
B. Current Trends in Intellectual Property Litigation in the United States
Statistics in recent years do not lend much support to the outcries from different corners of the United States seeking to reduce the rights of intellectual property owners and to curb litigation excesses. 60 Fiscal year 2007 showed a 6.7% decline in cases filed. Thus, the overall change for trademark cases in the five-year period was flat at 0.3%.
Copyright cases, on the other hand, showed larger, double-digit percentage changes. 64 Most notably, in 2005 there was a very large increase of 92.8% growth, due in large part to actions by the music industry to slow online song piracy. 65 During the five-year period, the yearly percentage change for copyright case filings averaged a 21.5% increase.
Overall, the number of intellectual property litigation cases in the United States from 2002-2007 remained relatively flat in both trademark and patent areas. 66 There were more litigation activities in the copyright field. 67 These numbers, as a whole, fail to support the demand for a reform to intellectual property litigation, particularly in the area of patent reform. Nevertheless, the reform demand, as discussed in Part I.A, has been relentless, as lobbyists and reformers portray the patent law and litigation systems to be broken and uncontrollable. In the United States, the pendulum of intellectual property protection has begun swinging from a strong protection regime for patent owners towards a weaker system due to the belief that more innovation can only be achieved when patent owners have fewer property rights. The pendulum in China is swinging in the opposite direction. These writings assert that the piracy problem has had a severe effect on multinational companies; some estimates show that perhaps a third of China's GDP is derived from counterfeit goods. 69 Pirated products permeate virtually every industry in China. About 90% of software and 95% of video games in China are counterfeit; 70 5 out of 6 Yamaha motorcycles sold in China are not genuine; 71 and more than 50% of all cell phones, shampoo, razor blades, chewing gum, and cigarettes sold are fakes. 72 Counterfeit DVDs and designer goods are available for significantly less than authentic items. 73 Over the years, counterfeiters have become more sophisticated and greedy as they have discovered, for example, that large profits can be made from counterfeited medicines like antimalarial and antibiotic drugs. 74 Likewise, counterfeit car parts are manufactured in China to replace genuine parts 75 and are used in both authentic and imitation cars; 76 this yields higher monetary returns than simpler items like counterfeit DVDs.
II. THE OLD PIRACY VIEW
Not only are counterfeit products widely available in China, they are made for export worldwide and are estimated to be valued at approximately $60 billion a year. 77 79 The piracy in China is so profound that multinational companies have begun experimenting with novel tactics to combat a problem that seems uncontrollable with conventional methods. For example, to fight bootleg DVDs, which typically cost less than $1 each, Time-Warner reduced the price of authentic DVDs by 90% to a price of $3 per DVD. 80 Microsoft, whose software programs are among the most popular items to pirate in China, worked with China's Lenovo Company to preinstall Microsoft Windows on Lenovo computers. 81 The U.S. government has its own approach, albeit heavily influenced by U.S. intellectual property owners, to solve the Chinese piracy problem. Through consultations with intellectual property rights holders, the United States decided to shame China "for failure to effectively protect intellectual property rights and to meet its commitment to significantly reduce infringement levels." 82 On April 29, 2005, the Office of the United States Trade Representative announced that it was placing China on the "Priority Watch List," because it had "serious concerns" about China's compliance with its obligations under various agreements relating to intellectual property. 83 Subsequently, the United States government utilized World Trade Organization enforcement procedures to bring suit against China. 84 Scholars, commentators, and industry experts have expounded many theories on Chinese piracy and have offered various explanations for and solutions to the Chinese piracy problem. 85 "culture" as the root of the problem, 86 while others focus on economics as the key factor. 87 Still others claim use politics to explain the China piracy problem. 88 Despite their different approaches to the China piracy problem, experts nonetheless agree that China's piracy issue lies in China's failure to recognize (or its lack of respect for) private intellectual property rights and the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism. 89 All seem to paint a picture of intellectual property anarchy in China, in which even the most minimal enforcement of intellectual property rights is lacking.
III. EMBRACING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
A. Defying the Normative View Through Recent Statistics
While the United States continues to possess negative views about China and its intellectual property rights regime, recent statistics offer a startlingly different picture. The numbers representing litigation cases brought by Chinese intellectual property owners reveal that China has embraced intellectual property rights on an unprecedented scale. The data suggests that Chinese owners of intellectual property have come to highly value their property rights, recognize intellectual property as an important asset and utilize 86 . See generally ALFORD, supra note 68. Compare Crane, supra note 84, at 104-08 (arguing against the view that China's culture underlies intellectual property piracy), with Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 222-23 (2006) (stating that the lack of political will to stop piracy derives from economic reliance on piracy Table 3 contains the total numbers of Chinese intellectual property cases and encompasses patent, trademark, and copyright, as well as, inter alia unfair competition, technology contract, and other intellectual property cases from the courts of first instance, second instance, and retrial proceedings for each of the calendar years from 2004 to 2007. Table 4 contains the subsequent five years, from 2003 to 2007, there were 61,837 total intellectual property cases filed in courts of first instance, constituting a 16% increase from the total number of intellectual property cases filed in the previous eighteen years. 104 Table 3 shows that the Chinese courts received 12,205 intellectual property cases in 2004, including first instance, second instance, and re-trial proceedings. 105 The number reflects a 31.7% increase from 2003. 106 The courts disposed of a total of 11,113 intellectual property cases. 107 There were 9,329 first-instance intellectual property cases filed in 2004, and the courts of first instance disposed of 8,332 cases. 108 In 2005, the number of Chinese intellectual property litigation cases filed continued to climb. 109 That year, the courts received 16,583 intellectual property cases from all court levels, or an increase of 35.9% from 2004. 110 The number of first-instance cases in 2005 was 13,424. 111 In total, the courts disposed of 16,453 cases. 112 Chinese courts concluded 13,393 first-instance intellectual property cases. 113 Table 3 indicates that in 2006, intellectual property cases filed totaled 16,947. 114 The number reflects an increase of 2.2% over 2005. 115 Table 4 shows that there were 14,219 intellectual property cases of first instance filed in 2006. 116 The courts disposed of a sum of 16,750 intellectual property cases; 117 and the courts of first instance concluded 14,056 cases. 118 Table 3 shows the statistics for the year 2007, which reveal that courts of all levels in China presided over 20,781 intellectual property cases, an increase cases, 18,654 involved patents, 14,708 pertained to copyrights, 6,629 involved trademarks, and 8,368 involved "other kinds" of intellectual property rights cases such as unfair competition, trade secret, and technology license disputes. Id. The data represented for the number of intellectual property civil cases of the first instance from 1985 from 2003 was not provided by this source. The number given was calculated using the data contained in WHITE PAPER 2004, supra note 92 (stating that in 2004 there were 9,329 intellectual property cases filed in courts of the first instance, a 33.51% increase from 2003).
104. See supra With respect to patent litigation, one area which the United States Congress has recently spent valuable time attempting to reform by reducing the strong property rights enjoyed by patent owners, 160 there is a stark difference between the United States and China. Even though United States industries have been complaining that there are too many patent lawsuits, because patent owners have become too aggressive and abusive in bringing suits in the United States, the number of patent cases is significantly higher in China, as shown in Table 9 , supra. There were more patent litigation cases filed in China from 2005 through 2007-10,184 cases, compared to 8,391 cases filed in the United States during the same three years. 161 In summary, these numbers demonstrate that there is now more intellectual property litigation in China than in the United States, a country that has been known for both providing robust intellectual property protection and as a highly litigious nation in the area of intellectual property rights. 162 The increasing number of litigation cases in China, however, suggests that China has begun to value intellectual property rights. China has demonstrated its willingness to utilize the judicial systems to prosecute, defend, and solve intellectual property disputes. The overwhelming majority of intellectual property litigation in China is brought by Chinese companies and individuals. 163 For example, in 2006, only 2.5% of intellectual property cases in China involved foreign litigants. 164 The evidence seems to suggest that Chinese businesses and individuals have learned in a very short time to 158. Calculations based on data provided in recognize and embrace the fruit of their intellectual endeavors and they are not hesitant to fight for their intellectual property rights. Quantitative data, however, does not represent the full picture of the new China and its embrace of intellectual property rights and reliance on the judicial system to protect and enforce these rights. A review of actual cases provides a more complete picture.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS AS LITIGANTS: AN EXAMINATION OF CASES
Intellectual property decisions rendered by Chinese courts are available at www.lawinfochina.com, a site for English translations of Chinese statutes, cases, and other legal information. 165 The Legal Information Center of Peking University translates Chinese legal resources into English and maintains the website with up-to-date data. 166 The cases in the database are translated from Chinese official sources, 167 of which the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court of China comprises the majority. 168 The case database, according to the website, contains typical cases approved and released by the Court in a number of areas, including intellectual property. 169 The cases are selected to reflect "both current and predicted future trends in Chinese legal practice." 170 The following are some representative samples of the cases and issues related to different types of intellectual property disputes. 165 In this copyright infringement case, the plaintiffs (Huang Zhyiy and Xu Lingzhi) created, at the defendants' request, a television advertisement for "Be Le Electric Appliances," one of the defendants' clients. 172 The defendants subsequently used the plaintiffs' "design and conceptual creation" for their advertisement but did not compensate the plaintiffs for the creation. 173 No employment contract was executed between the parties. 174 The plaintiffs filed a copyright infringement action against the defendants in January 1994. 175 Upon reviewing the evidence, a panel of three judges determined that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' copyright and ordered the defendants pay 25,548 yuan in reparations. 176 Before rendering the decision, the court asked the Copyrights Bureau to conduct a comparison between the plaintiffs' and the defendants' advertising programs. 177 The Copyright Bureau concluded that "there exist obvious innate connections between the two, [sic] it can be confirmed that the advertising was manufactured following the Plaintiffs' conception." 178
Beijing Huaqi Multimedia Corp. v. Shandong TV Station 179
The plaintiffs, producers of the "Waiting All the Way" television series, brought a copyright infringement action against the defendants, Shandong TV Station, for broadcasting the series in China and other Asian countries without their authorization. 180 The defendants argued that they had obtained the right to broadcast the television series from the plaintiffs' agent, Hongzhou Fulaite Advertising Originality Center (Originality Center). 181 The defendants claimed that Originality Center had concluded a broadcasting contract for the television 171. Huang Zhi Yi Deng (Yuangao) He Nanjing Guoji Kaifa Gongsi Deng (Beigao) (黄之等 (原告) 和南京国际 开 发公司等 (被告)) [Huang Zhiyi v. Nanjing Int'l Dev. Co 188 Since Liu Jinsheng held the copyright to his translation of Don Quixote, Liu Jinsheng brought a copyright infringement action against Sohu. 189 The defendant argued that it functioned as a web operator and never published the translation on Sohu's own website -www.sohu.com-but did admit that the translation was shown as published on www.shuku.net, www.cj888.com, and www.chenqinmyrice.com; the defendant also acknowledged that www.sohu.com linked to the three websites. 190 The evidence further established that the plaintiff had approached the defendant to take appropriate measures and cease linking to the three websites that had illegally uploaded his work, but Sohu had refused to comply. 191 infringed upon Liu Jinsheng's copyright and "caused the aggravation of the infringement." 192 The panel ordered Sohu to pay 3,000 yuan to Liu Jinsheng and make a written apology. 193 In summary, these cases reveal that Chinese owners of copyrighted works such as advertisements, television series, and translations understand that the concept of intellectual property ownership and that the unauthorized use of copyrights causes economic loss. By ordering compensatory damages, the judicial system itself recognizes property rights and the losses incurred. These types of cases are no different than the types of copyright infringement cases brought in the United States. 194
C. Embracing Property Rights in Patents
Renda Building Materials Factory v. Xinyi Company
The plaintiff, Renda, was the exclusive licensee of a patent for a "concrete thin-walled tubular member;" the license resulted from a contract between Renda and the inventor entered on February 16, 2001. 195 patented invention. 196 The alleged infringing product contained some minor changes. 197 Upon a comprehensive infringement analysis, the Intermediate Court of Dalian Municipality held that there were no essential distinctions between the patent and the accused products. 198 The Intermediate Court ordered the defendant to pay 100,000 yuan to compensate the plaintiff for its losses. 199 The defendant appealed the case to Liaoning Higher Court. 200 On April 19, 2004, the court affirmed the Intermediate Court's decision. 201 The defendant then appealed the case to the Supreme People's Court, the highest court in China. 202 On August 22, 2005, the Court overruled the Intermediate Court's decision, stating that the decision was erroneous because it ruled to exclude certain technical features disclosed by the patentee in the independent description of the invention and had erred in finding certain features of the accused product equivalent to a corresponding element in the patent. 203
Dayang Company v. Huanghe Company
On November 19, 1999, Huanghe Company and Dayang Company entered into a patent licensing agreement to exploit Huanghe's patent used in stone cutting, pressing, and mounding machines. 204 Thereafter, the parties engaged in a contractual dispute relating to payment. 205 Dayang filed an action to rescind the contract and requested Huanghe return a certain sum that was owed. 206 Dayang also alleged that the contract was invalid because the patent at issue illegally monopolized the technology and impeded future technological progress. 207 On June 16, 2004, the Supreme People's Court held that the patent license obtained by Dayang from Huanghe did not violate any laws, and therefore, the contract was valid. 208 The above representative patent cases indicate that Chinese patent owners utilized their property rights by licensing the patents to others for the manufacture and distribution of the products based on the patents. Patentees and exclusive licensees enforced their patent rights against contracting parties and others whom breached license agreements and infringed on the patents. These cases also demonstrated that defendants understand their rights by asserting available defenses such as non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, patent invalidity, and patent misuse. Both parties utilized the judicial system and appealed all the way to the highest courts in China. The decisions in these cases reflected the courts' understanding of the technologies involved in regard to patent infringement issues. These types of cases are similar to the types of patent cases brought in the United States. 209
D. Trademark Cases
Beijing Delifrance Food Co. v. Beijing Sun City Shopping Mall
Plaintiff Beijing Delifrance is the owner of the Delifrance trademark registration for a bread product. 210 In October 1992, the plaintiff entered into an agreement to distribute its bread to defendant, Beijing Sun City, to be sold under the Delifrance trademark. 211 On April 14, 1993, the plaintiff stopped supplying the bread to the defendant. 212 The defendant, in the meantime, decided to sell bread provided by different suppliers but under Beijing Delifrance's trademark without authorization. 213 The bread offered by the defendant had a similar shape and appearance to that produced by Beijing Delifrance. 214 As a result, Beijing Delifrance brought a trademark The plaintiff claimed that its corporate name, Bi Feng Tang, functioned as its brand name through heavy advertising in the Shanghai catering service industry. 217 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, De Rong Tang, beginning on August 13, 2002, misled the public with false publicity through using the name Bi Feng Tang without permission on its signboards and tables in its dining hall and in its advertisements. 218 The plaintiff brought an unfair competition and infringement action against the defendant. 219 On June 18, 2003, the Shanghai Intermediate Court found that the name Bi Feng Tang was the general name of a cooking method or the name of a dish. 220 The name Bi Feng Tang was not a distinctive mark of the plaintiff's catering services. 221 The court held that the plaintiff had no right to prohibit others from using the name Bi Feng Tang. 222 3. Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Co. v. Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Co.
The plaintiff, Nanjing Xuezhong Caiying Company (NXC), a wedding photography service, obtained the trademark registration for "Xuezhong Caiying" (translated as "Snow-view Color Photo") in 1996. 223 The trademark registration was valid for ten years, from 1996 to 2006. 224 NXC received wide recognition for its services, and was awarded the Top 10 Brand Award of Global Chinese Professional Wedding Photography. 225 NXC discovered in August, 2004 that the defendant, Shanghai Xuezhong Caiying Company (SXC), was using "Xuezhong Caiying" as a trademark and enterprise name for its own photography service. 226 NXC brought both trademark infringement and unfair competition claims against the defendant. 227 On May 30, 2005, the Nanjing Intermediate Court found that the defendant deliberately took advantage of the plaintiff's famed trademark, and that its conduct caused consumer confusion. 228 The court enjoined the defendant from using the name "Xuezhong Caiying" and ordered it to pay 20,000 yuan to the plaintiff. 229 Like the patent and copyright cases, the trademark cases brought by Chinese individuals and entities against other Chinese individuals and entities are normative disputes relating to intellectual property rights. The trademark cases are typical of normative disputes because they are concerned with the uses of a mark similar or identical to someone else's name or registered trademark. 230 The sample disputes focused on whether the plaintiff owns a protectable trademark, whether the defendant's use causes consumer confusion, and whether the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff's trademark and used it in connection with the defendant's goods and services. 231 These types of trademark cases are similar to the types of trademark cases litigated in the United States. 232 Indeed, on any given day, decisions related to SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:773 trademark infringement and unfair competition claims are being rendered based on similar fact patterns in both countries. Once more, the types of trademark cases in China are similar to those in the United States. The presence of Chinese trademark cases demonstrates that Chinese trademark owners view their trademarks as important assets in their business operations. They are not hesitant to enforce their trademark rights, they utilize judicial means to enforce their rights, and they rely on the judicial system to enjoin the alleged infringing conduct. In summary, the above examples of written decisions on copyright, patent, and trademark disputes show that the judicial system promptly resolved the cases. 233
V. MISSING FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS IN CHINA
While the statistics and translations of case databases reveal that Chinese intellectual property owners have recognized the importance of intellectual property, policed their rights, and employed the legal system to enforce their property rights, there is a peculiar absence of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants among the tens of thousands of cases involving intellectual property rights in China. 234 Foreign owners of intellectual property can hardly be found as plaintiffs, both qualitatively and quantitatively, among the statistics of cases and written opinions. Less than 5% of all intellectual against the defendant for using the words "duck tours" in connection with its services. Id. at 10. The First Circuit held that "duck tour" was a generic phrase for amphibious sightseeing tours, and enjoys no trademark protection. Id. at 18.
In Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., the manufacturer of "Beanie Babies" brought an action against the defendant for deliberate and willful trademark infringement conduct. 517 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2008). The defendant sold products looking very much like "Beanie Babies," and called them "Screenie Babies." Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the defendant's infringement was willful, because it had chosen the name "Screenie Beanies" and the design of its screen cleaners "with reckless disregard for the likelihood of consumer confusion." Id. at 501.
233. The judges disposed the majority of the cases within one to two years. A chart tracking the disposition of the cases available through Law Info China is on file with the Author. Cases advanced to the appellate court were also promptly resolved. Perhaps judges in China can dispose of copyright cases in a much shorter timetable compared to the disposition length in the United States because the United States has longer and more complex discovery procedures, as well as pretrial, trial, and appeal processes. Press and Grand World Company. 261 The plaintiff asserted that its Classic Value Stories (including Bambi, Peter Pan, and seven other books) were duplicated and distributed by the defendants without permission. 262 The Beijing Intermediate People's Court enjoined the defendants' infringement conduct, ordered the defendant Beijing Publishing Press to publicly apologize in one of the nationwide newspapers published in China, and pay a sum of 227,094 yuan to the Walt Disney Co. 263 In 1995 the appellate court, the Beijing Higher People's Court, affirmed most of the rulings rendered by the lower court. 264 The appellate court also held that defendant Beijing Publishing Press, not Children's Publishing Press, should bear the damages. 265 In addition, the appellate court held that other defendants were responsible to pay the damages, but not Grand World Company. 266 The cases above brought by foreign intellectual property owners represent only a very small percentage of cases in China. In 2005 there were 13,424 intellectual property cases in the first instance, but only 449 cases, or 3.3%, were filed by foreign intellectual property owners. 267 Of the 449 cases, 108 were filed by intellectual property owners from Hong Kong. 268 The actual percentage of litigations filed by foreign intellectual property owners is even smaller, once the cases filed by Hong Kong excluded. These percentages did not change much in the following year of 2006. In that year, 14,219 intellectual property cases were filed in the first instance, but only 353 cases, or 2.5%, involved foreign litigants. 269
VI. CONCLUSION
The statistics and case databases clearly paint a new picture of the New China and intellectual property rights. Chinese individuals and businesses are now the owners of intellectual property rights and assets. China has created a vigorous enforcement environment for intellectual property. The tens of thousands of cases that have been brought to the courts and decided each year signify a sharp pendulum swing from a weak to a strong intellectual property 261 rights regime. 270 The rapid changes in China's intellectual property litigation through its judicial system is, indeed, confounding when the statistics are compared to the increasingly fewer intellectual property cases in the United States. 271 The statistics from both countries indicate that China is now rapidly moving from a weak to a stronger regime while the United States is taking the opposite stance by moving from a strong to a more moderate direction. Moreover, Chinese statistics reveal another set of surprise results: The infinitesimally small number of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants in China. 272 The sparse nature of these cases is contradictory to the persistent outcry against Chinese piracy and the abuse of intellectual property rights belonging to foreign owners. 273 Why are so many Chinese cases, more than 95% of them, 274 brought by Chinese litigants against other Chinese? Why has there been an absence of reports or studies on the transformation in China with respect to intellectual property rights? Perhaps one of the reasons is that the long, beleaguered outcry about piracy and the long-established belief that China does not recognize, protect, or enforce intellectual property rights prevents most if not all in the United States and the West from acknowledging the rapid changes unfolding in China with respect to intellectual property litigations in recent years. This Article perhaps will provide a new window into China's current approach to intellectual property rights, enforcements, and litigation.
270. This confirms the observation that there is an increase in intellectual protections in China as the Chinese have started to become intellectual property stakeholders. See Yu, supra note 9, at 370-71 (discussing the creation of government agencies that handle intellectual property affairs and the trend of Chinese becoming stakeholders in intellectual property 
